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ABSTRACT
A New Security Paradigms Workshop (2013) panel discussed
the topic of ethical issues and implications related to mar-
kets for zero-day exploits, i.e., markets facilitating the sale of
previously unknown details on how to exploit software vul-
nerabilities in target applications or systems. The related
topic of vulnerability rewards programs (\bug bounties" of-
fered by software vendors) was also discussed. This note
provides selected background material submitted prior to
the panel presentation, and summarizes discussion resulting
from the input of both the panelists and NSPW participants.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; K.6.0 [Management
of Computing and Information Systems]: General|
Economics; D.4.6 [Software]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Vulnerabilities; Exploits; Security Economics
1. INTRODUCTION
Zero-day exploits (\0-days") are techniques that exploit vul-
nerabilities in a target software program, where the vulner-
abilities are not yet known by the developers of the target
program or other parties, and for which xes are therefore
not yet available. The trading of software exploits between
hackers is an activity with a long history; it has become more
interesting as criminal elements have increasingly used such
exploits for their own economic benet. Selling of 0-days by
security researchers as a supposedly\legitimate source of in-
come"is an interesting spin on this|but already for several
years now, some software companies have oered, to soft-
ware experts wearing hats of various colors, bug bounties for
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private technical details of new exploits targeting that com-
pany's own products. Some may question the ethics and
implications of this practice; the issues become even more
interesting when the exploits are bought by parties other
than the developers of the targeted software. Indeed, 0-day
markets do not lead to public disclosure when the interests
of the buyers are better served by having the vulnerabilities
remain unpatched [16].
Our interest is in markets that facilitate the sale of 0-
days|not the existence or mechanics of such markets per
se, but rather the implications and ethical issues related
to the development, promotion, use, and possible regula-
tion of such markets. A primary motivation is the growing
popularity of markets for 0-days as evident from recent me-
dia articles [4, 5, 6, 7, 14], the growing prices of exploits
in such markets, and the lack of discussion to date by the
mainstream academic community of the ethics and security
implications.
We believe that this topic is timely, as it involves the rela-
tively new paradigm of markets for 0-days. One of our goals
is to increase awareness among researchers of such markets,
and in particular, related ethical issues and implications. We
believe that the general topic of ethics within computer se-
curity deserves greater attention in academic curricula, and
thus discussion of interesting, novel ethical topics in major
forums benets the community, and students in particular.
Between them, the panelists represent academia (two cur-
rently at universities and all with active publication records),
industrial views (two have extensive background in indus-
try), and government (one has worked in, and all have worked
with, government).
2. RELATEDWORKANDRECENTPRESS
A brief chronological summary of selected related litera-
ture and media articles follows.
 Rescorla's 2003-2004 work [13] raises interesting ques-
tions about the utility and benets of searching for
software bugs, considering both whitehats and black-
hats; in particular, he raises the possibility that eort
spent nding vulnerabilities may not signicantly in-
crease software quality.
 Ozment's 2004 paper [11] summarizes Schechter's ear-
lier formulation of vulnerability markets [15] (which
included the \market price of vulnerability" concept),
and proposes that there are advantages to considering
vulnerability markets in terms of bug auctions. Ozment's 2005 work [12] revisits Rescorla's view that
vulnerability hunting may be of questionable social
benet, giving evidence of a higher likelihood of re-
discovery of bugs by independent parties (e.g., black-
hats nding the same bugs that whitehats might nd),
suggesting that hunting eort oers greater utility.
 B ohme's 2005-2006 work [1] gives terminology for four
economic markets related to software vulnerabilities:
bug challenges (including bug bounties and bug auc-
tions), vulnerability brokers (buying details for circu-
lation to other subscribers), exploit derivatives (con-
tracts paying out xed sums upon occurrence of secu-
rity events), and cyber-insurance.
 Miller's 2007 work [9] notes problems faced by a secu-
rity researcher wishing to sell 0-day exploits to a\legit-
imate buyer." He mentions bug bounty programs that
existed as early as 1995 (Netscape), and other orga-
nizations paying for vulnerability information in bug-
buying programs (e.g., Mozilla, iDefense Labs (Ver-
sign), the Zero Day Initiative of the TippingPoint di-
vision of 3Com), as well as the details of his own sale
of an exploit to the NSA for $50,000.
 (Jan. 31 2010) article on WRAL TechWire [14] dis-
cusses the underground market, and specically men-
tions Google's bug-bounty program for Chrome browser
bugs (and others as noted by Miller above).
 (Mar. 23, 2012) Greenberg [7] discusses the $250,000
sale of an iOS exploit arranged by exploit broker \the
Grugq," and mentions the French company Vupens
specializing in selling exploits as proled in Forbes
magazine (Apr. 9 2012). The raises the question whether
0-day markets should be regulated?
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 (Mar. 29 2012) soon thereafter, Hofman and Timm [8]
cite Greenberg's discussion of the\dangerous but largely
underreported problem in internet security: the sale
of 0-day exploits to customers not intending to x the
aws." Should laws disallow government agencies from
any activities that discourage xing of software vulner-
abilities?
 (May 30, 2012) Schneier [16] notes that originally, boun-
ties resulted in bugs being xed, but now criminals|
and governments
2|buy bugs for private exploitation,
beneting from the bugs not being xed and the de-
tails not being publicly disclosed. He suggests that
the economics of 0-day markets are detrimental to so-
ciety, as they motivate the private sale of exploits: pre-
viously when third parties found vulnerabilities, eco-
nomics favored disclosure (for hacker notoriety, aca-
demic credit, and consulting credibility), pressuring
vendors to patch and improve security.
3
 (January, 2013) the popular CanSecWest Pwn2Own
contests (e.g., see [5]), ongoing since about 2007, show
1See also March 15, 2013 article by Mueller [10].
2This is as well as agents buying the exploits as middlemen,
for governments preferring to deal through contractors.
3This is especially true when done\responsibly,"i.e., disclo-
sure after sucient advance notice to allow xes a priori.
the increasing popularity of big-dollar rewards for ex-
ploit details, with those details not always owing back
to the developers of the targeted software. In a twist
on this, in September 2013, a website arose to crowd-
source a reward for the rst demonstrated defeat of the
ngerprint sensor on Apple's new iPhone 5S phone.
 Finifter et al. [2] studied empirical data on the vulnera-
bility rewards programs of Google Chrome and Mozilla
Firefox|thus, both directly involving software devel-
opers of the target software, whose interest is presum-
ably in xing the vulnerabilities rather than exploit-
ing them. Over a three-year period, 28% and 24%,
respectively, of Chrome and Firefox patched vulner-
abilities reported in security advisories resulted from
these bug bounty programs. The authors suggest that
both programs compare favorably (from the viewpoint
of the software vendor) to hiring full-time security re-
searchers, and correspondingly from the viewpoint of
the aw-nders in such bounty programs, the economic
compensation is inferior to a full-time job.
 A Microsoft bug bounty program announced June 2013
oered rewards up to US$100,000 for identifying and
xing major product security aws. In October 2013,
it paid out [3] US$100,000 to James Forshaw related
to a aw he found in the Windows operating system.
For further discussion of related work, among other pub-
lications, we recommend B ohme [1] for an early view, and
Finifter et al. [2] for more recent work.
3. PANEL FORMAT AND SET-UP
The panel format was as follows. The third author pro-
vided brief setting and background, serving as panel/session
chair. He very briey mentioned selected related work (see
above), posed two questions for discussion (see next para-
graph), and dened the following base terminology.
 A Vulnerability Rewards Program (VRP) is a program
whereby a software vendor pays an outside researcher a
\bug bounty"for disclosing details of a security-related
software aw.
 A Zero-Day Market (ZDM) is a market resulting in
the sale of exploit or bug details; a vendor responsible
for developing the software in question may (but often
will not) learn these details as a result.
The rst two authors were assigned as panelists to argue
opposite sides of two intentionally broad/vague statements:
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1. \VRPs are benecial"
2. \ZDMs are benecial"
To focus and stimulate discussion, a set of background ques-
tions (see immediately below) were presented both in the
workshop pre-proceedings, and at the start of the panel ses-
sion itself. Example arguments for and against VRPs and
ZDMs (see the following sub-sections) were also provided in
4One NSPW attendee suggested that the propositions were
not ideally suited for the purpose, and that a better debate
would result from a statement such as: \Be it resolved that
ACM members should not participate in ZDMs."the pre-workshop proceedings. After brief opening remarks
by the two debating panelists, the NSPW attendees (partic-
ipants) were asked to participate by contributing their own
input, observations, or questions to the panelists.
The following example questions were posed at the be-
ginning of the panel session, as background to focus dis-
cussion. The panelists and NSPW attendees were asked to
consider these questions, with respect to both VRPs and
ZDMs (jointly, or individually).
1. Do they turn strong young programmers into black-
hats| or motivate development of much-needed secu-
rity skills?
2. Do they threaten in-house security careers?
3. For whom are they benecial?
4. Do they result in the discovery of vulnerabilities that
would otherwise remain dormant?
5. Do they result in fewer public disclosures of bugs?
6. Do they subsidize undesirable activities (e.g., criminal
activities, or unethical government use of exploits), or
are they a highly economical way to nd bugs?
7. Should they be regulated markets?
Much of the ensuing discussion centred on these questions.
A number of the example\for"and\against"arguments (see
following subsections) similarly touch on these questions.
3.1 Example arguments “FOR”
The following example arguments for VRPs and/or ZDMs
were given prior to the formal panel session.
 We need all the help we can get. The software industry
spends a lot of eort discovering bugs. We can't aord
to neglect any avenue to improving our discovery rate.
 Tournaments are the least-cost way of getting work
done. We can get the maximum number of exploits
for the minimum cost.
 Having good relations with more responsible members
of the hacking community increases the chance of hav-
ing eyes and ears into goings-on.
 Large-scale eort at discovering vulnerabilities is healthy.
Regular sustained eort makes it less likely that un-
spent fuel accumulates. Assertion: the potential for
catastrophic societal harm is less if vulnerabilities are
exposed in an evenly spaced fashion than if they were
used all at once. The potential for major hacks on
critical infrastructure is reduced if an army of people
is constantly looking and reporting.
 There's already a market for vulnerabilities, but hack-
ers are paid in fame and notoriety. Blackhat, defcon,
and dozens of other `cons' are bazaars where hackers
try to leverage their exploits into pen testing gigs, free
drinks, book deals, interviews, blog trac or twitter
followers. Society would be better served if this pro-
cess of monetizing exploits resembled a market more
and \Keeping up with the Kardashians" less.
 Computer security does not need yet another topic
which drives us to absolutist positions. Dealing with a
world-of-grey morally ambiguous issue where the lines
are unclear would be good for us. Lessons learned
might be put to good use elsewhere.
3.2 Example arguments “AGAINST”
The following example arguments against VRPs and/or
ZDMs were given prior to the formal panel session.
 Injecting money into dubious circles is morally suspect.
Cybercriminal circles intersect with organized crime,
drug cartels and terrorism. We should not be involved
in nancing these operations.
 The cobra eect:
5 paying for exploits creates an ad-
verse incentive to plant bugs for later harvest. Humans
are extraordinarily good at gaming any system put in
place, and the chance of software that is less (vs. more)
secure is very real.
 Is this just a way for companies like Microsoft, Google
and Apple to outsource product testing on the cheap?
If they can get away with getting work done without
paying salary and benets, they will. Is it good for
society, or the industry, if that happens?
 0-day markets encourage the private sale (and non-
disclosure) of details of exploits, to better allow the
buyer to execute the exploit for private benet.
 Markets create attractive incentives for more smart
people to spend time nding vulnerabilities|and if
it is true that the more you look, the more bugs you
will nd, then such attractive markets will increase the
number of (privately-known) vulnerabilities.
 If a software producer buys an exploit, they may re-
quire a signed NDA as a condition of the sale, which
may result in a x being developed much slower than
if the vulnerability were simply publicized.
 Assertion: this isn't the most ecient way of allocat-
ing resources. It would be more ecient to use the
bounties for other purposes, e.g., training developers
to make fewer mistakes.
4. INTEGRATEDDISCUSSIONSUMMARY
As noted above, one panelist was assigned to argue for
the case that VRPs and ZDMs are benecial, while a second
was assigned to argue against them being benecial. After
brief background from the panel chair and opening argu-
ments from the two panelists, the chair took round-robin in-
put from the NSPW participants, requesting that comments
and discussion focus, as much as possible, on issues related
to ethics and implications. Time allowed just over two-thirds
of the NSPW attendees to provide their input; the remain-
ing attendees were invited to submit remarks to the NSPW
scribe (a standing option at NSPW), who recorded all com-
ments (and provided same to the authors). The selective
summary below combines discussion points raised, includ-
ing observations, assertions, and questions.
5See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_effect1. VRP benets include expanding the eld of experts. A
benecial aspect of VRPs is that they provide new
opportunities to developers and thus help expand the
eld. One NSPW participant had met developers who
entered the eld through bug bounty funding, in an en-
vironment where no companies employed developers;
and Finifter et al. [2] note that several researchers who
distinguished themselves through the VRP programs
of Google and Mozilla were later hired by those orga-
nizations. One participant noted that this eld expan-
sion might be negative in the sense of\more jobs creat-
ing worse software;"a counterpoint was that corporate
developers are rewarded better for jobs well done than
for \burying Easter eggs."
2. VRPs and ethics in embedded/other special systems.
Are ethical issues dierent for VRPs targeting vulner-
abilities in embedded systems (vs. standard desktop
client software, mobile device software, or server soft-
ware)? Are there specic scenarios where we should
avoid creating incentives for vulnerability discovery if
the consequences are especially serious? Would it be
ethical to sell, or trade in, vulnerabilities in voting sys-
tems? A general observation is that markets are most
likely to be ethical when the producer of the system is
the party who has the highest incentive to pay for vul-
nerabilities; thus a market for vulnerabilities in voting
systems may not have favorable ethics.
3. Ethics and markets. A counter argument is that ethics
are irrelevant to markets|markets exist whether we
like it or not. Many corporations act independently
of ethical considerations, motivated by prot goals.
ZDMs themselves may be viewed as ethically neutral;
what is important is the ethics of the actors involved
including the discoverer and the parties willing to pay
for information discovered, and how they play out; how
does the discoverer choose what oer to accept? Eth-
ical questions arise if buyers have ill intent. Bugs sold
directly to a vendor retain residual value on a ZDM
(patches aren't deployed immediately or universally).
4. Vulnerability or exploit, environments, price discovery.
Software vulnerabilities often depend on environment,
e.g., some are exploitable on specic platforms only.
Working exploits typically command greater bounties
than vulnerabilities which have not yet, or cannot,
be turned into exploits. Vulnerabilities are not in-
terchangeable nor directly comparable. Thus pricing
and establishing ecient markets is dicult. One par-
ticipant suggested that market regulations for VRPs
should require buyers to publish, in advance, their eval-
uation criteria for (valuing) vulnerabilities. Price dis-
covery is a potential challenge (the seller needs a way
to provide convincing evidence of the existence and
importance of his information, without revealing all
details themselves). A type of zero-knowledge proof
system would help (for a protocol, see Miller [9]).
5. Markets independent of software vendors. Some soft-
ware has no formal vendor|e.g., open source or other
free or community-maintained software. So, there may
be no vendor willing to pay for vulnerability informa-
tion. This motivates the need for markets independent
of a software vendor. Companies smaller than Mi-
crosoft and Google might not be able to aord to par-
ticipate in an ecient market. Should smaller vendors
charge a premium to high-risk customers to subsidize
their participation in the markets? Small developers
may not have the capability to pay bug bounties.
6. Fishing the bug pool vs. rewarding secure design. Is
it true that the more vulnerabilities that are found,
the fewer there are left?
6 How big are the reserves
of vulnerabilities|though they may get harder to nd
(i.e., the price may go up), with more work might we
keep nding as many bugs as we want? (Is there an
analogy to fossil fuel market; are we \in a fracking
situation?") Is our energy not better spent nding a
way to reward the creation of knowledge on how to
create systems with stronger security properties?
7. Markets with prices that reveal information. Related
to this, it was suggested that markets should be de-
signed to reward secure development/deployment|i.e.,
market prices should reveal or reect something about
the security of the underlying products, extracting hid-
den information.
7 Cobra eects can be addressed by
options contracts that reward vendors for deploying se-
cure products|e.g., \We pay out a reward if no cobra
is seen before the end of the week."
8. Academia as a VRP. It was suggested that academia
is possibly the largest VRP. Professors are rewarded
for papers that describe and analyze vulnerabilities;
many security consultants also publicize their ndings,
to build up their credibility. Do VRPs broadly de-
ned (including a culture bestowing benets to aca-
demics and consultants) incentivize, in a \smart sub-
population," a \continuing to look for bugs" behavior
over one of \learning how to build better systems?"
9. Goods of dierent value to dierent actors. VRPs and
ZDMs are not new. An old question is: How do we re-
solve any incentive mismatch whereby exploiters pay
a higher price than defenders? The goods don't have
equal value to all market participants. This market has
characteristics of extortion, and needs transparency in
terms of the same information to all participants (cf.
Miller [9]). For example, would a vulnerability allow-
ing shut-down of a pacemaker be worth much more to
the patient than the device manufacturer? (This may
depend on any liability the manufacturer may bear.)
For vulnerabilities that can be leveraged into power-
ful exploits, there may be a stronger incentive to use
them as such rather than to sell them to vendors; but
some researchers may do the latter for ethical or rep-
utational (vs. monetary) reasons.
10. Vendor interaction with bug nders. How does indus-
try deal with actors who nd these bugs; what incen-
tives are oered to bring vendors the details, rather
than to the public or black markets? It ranges widely
from relying on perceptions of \public good,"\ethics"
and "the right thing to do," to bug bounties, to peer
and societal pressure. Not all individuals are equally
6See Rescorla [13] for discussion.
7See B ohme [1] for discussion.sensitive to such pressures. This may argue in favor of
regulating VRPs and ZDMs.
11. Cobra eect on credit card fraud. It was asserted that
credit card systems provide a big incentive to create
detectable fraud because in many countries, merchants
must pay for fraud through a service fee to the issuer.
Thus the issuing bank benets from greater volumes
of detectable fraud.
12. Cobra eect and anti-virus industry. It was observed
that fears of a cobra eect (by way of planting bugs)
are analogous to long-standing accusations that anti-
virus vendors create viruses to help sell their products.
13. Avoiding cobra eect. Incentives in ZDMs should be
designed to preclude cobra eects. The incentive to
plant Easter eggs (developers coding bugs intentionally
in order to later benet from their discovery), might
be decreased if the payment of a bounty decreases the
developers' bonus pool for the vulnerable product, or
if bug bounties paid were deducted from developers'
pay. On the other hand, the resourcefulness of devious
developers to nd ways to personally benet from any
system should not be underestimated.
14. Other unintended consequences. Aside from the cobra
eect of planting Easter eggs, we should consider other
side eects arising from the law of unintended conse-
quences. Money paid for vulnerabilities may remove
money from preventing vulnerabilities; and VRPs or
reactions to ZDMs may divert resources from design
activities in general, e.g., to respond to sensational
market or public events that might possibly impact a
corporate reputation through negative publicity. Con-
sider as an analogy radar-jamming in WWII: you could
jail people who jam radar, or create jam-proof radios
(the latter was done, via spread-spectrum techniques).
15. Openness of markets, and motives. Rather than ar-
gue whether or not markets for vulnerabilities should
exist, we should acknowledge that they already do
(whether we like it or not), and instead ask: Should
such markets be in the open? One opinion is that
open markets result in many more attacks|but there
is disagreement on this, and also on whether attackers
always have greater monetary resources|some large,
protable or well-funded vendors may have greater -
nancial resources and incentives than attackers. Face-
book presumably is more interested in paying for vul-
nerability information than most potential Facebook
attackers. A bug seller's motivation might not be en-
tirely nancial|e.g., a seller might even wish to sell
a vulnerability to a party who desires that it be used
to harm the software manufacturer. Development of
a ner understanding of the intrinsic motivations of
those who \work" in grey areas that may eect good
or ill is more likely if such activities are in the open.
16. Modeling. A better understanding of ZDMs may result
from pursuit of a precise, mathematical model of ac-
tors: vendors, employees of vendors, researchers (bug
nders), criminals, etc.
17. Regulating prices to avoid ZDMs. Can prices be reg-
ulated, e.g., by VRPs or other mechanisms, in such a
way as to avoid the need for ZDMs?
18. Rewards change behaviors. Experiments have shown
that rewards change actors' approaches to tasks; e.g.,
kids enjoy tasks more if rewarded for doing the task
well. An example noted was that vulnerabilities dis-
covered in response to incentive programs have been
more sophisticated than others.
19. ZDMs as art markets. Financial markets are not as
good an analogy for ZDMs as the art market: there
are a lot of private buyers, frequent over-the-counter
sales, and a requirement for rigorous quality control.
20. VRPs signalling software quality. Might software cus-
tomers eventually come to choose their vendor based
on the quality of its VRP program?
21. VRPs grooming blackhats. Do bug bounties turn devel-
opers into blackhats? This resembles questions about
pen testing and ethics|not all pen testers are moti-
vated by money, and there's a ne line between good
pen testers and hackers.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Vulnerability rewards programs (bug bounties) are gain-
ing popularity in the commercial world, along with interest
in related zero-day markets (vulnerability markets). These
may have important implications on the software industry,
and raise interesting ethical issues. Our goal in this note has
been to raise awareness of these topics across a broader au-
dience, and to renew academic pursuit of these topics which
received early attention a decade ago [1, 11, 15].
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